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Blame it on the Cybersquatters: How Congress
Partially Ends the Circus Among the Circuits With
the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act
Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen*

1. INTRODUCTION

Congress blamed the cybersquatters for the need to pass another
trademark cyberlaw.
Congress enacted the Anticybersquatting
Consumer Protection Act ("ACPA") on November 29, 1999.' The
ACPA aimed to protect consumers and businesses, to promote the
growth of electronic commerce, and to provide clarity in the law for
trademark owners by prohibiting cybersquatting activities on the
Internet. 2 Prior to the enactment of the ACPA, the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act ("FTDA"), 3 which was passed by Congress in 1995 and
became effective on January 16, 1996, was hailed as a powerful tool to
combat cybersquatters on the Internet.4 That presumed powerful tool
*
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1. Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501 (1999)
(codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d) (West 1998)).
2. See S. REP. No. 106-140, at 4 (1999); see also Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Mkt.,
Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 495 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting relevant legislative history on the purpose of the
ACPA). Cybersquatting is the bad faith registration of trademarks as domain names with the
intent to profit from the goodwill associated with such marks. Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 495.
3. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 987 (1995)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c) (West 1998)).
4. See Paul Heald, Sunbeam Prod., Inc. v. The West Bend Co.: Exposing the Malign
Application of the Federal Dilution Statute to Product Configurations, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 415,
416-17 (1998) ("[A] suit for dilution is easier to prove than infringement because the troublesome
factual question of consumer confusion is not relevant."); Stephen F. Mohr, The New Federal
Trademark Dilution Act: Expanding the Rights of Trademark Owners, in ANNUAL ADVANCED
SEMINAR ON TRADEMARK LAW 1997, at 9 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks & Literary
Prop. Course, Handbook Series No. G-476, 1997) ("The Dilution Act has already proven to be an
effective weapon for owners of arguably well-known or 'famous' trademarks to prevent a wide
range of third party uses of marks similar or identical to such marks."); Melanie M. Routh, Note,
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turned out to have very little magic.5 Congress passed the FTDA with
so little debate that it left many ambiguous terms undefined, such as
distinctiveness, fame, and dilution. These terms were immediately
subjected to a wide, polarized range of judicial interpretations by a
number of circuit courts. 6 A circus among the circuit courts has been
created as some courts extend the FTDA protection only to "nationally
renowned" trademarks while others only require the protected
trademarks to be known within a niche market. Another circuit court
takes an extreme position, requiring the protected trademarks to possess
both fame and heightened distinctiveness as a prerequisite to protection
under the FTDA. 7 On the dilution element of the FTDA, some circuits
require actual, consummated, dilutive harm to famous marks, while
others demand only a likelihood of dilution between the famous mark
and offending mark.8 The rigorous standard of proving a dilution claim
under the FTDA, coupled with the conflicting rulings among the circuit
courts, sends trademark owners back to the beginning in their combat
against diluters, particularly cybersquatters. 9 As a result, the once
wildly celebrated FTDA turns out to lack much luster.
Congress, instead of admitting that the problems associated with the
FTDA stemmed from Congress' haste to pass the FTDA without
sufficient legislative history or clear guidance that would lead to a
coherent and uniform interpretation, blamed the shortcomings of the
FTDA on cybersquatters. l0 To cure the shortcomings and outsmart the
Trademark Dilution and the Effect of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 50 RUTGERS L. REV.
253, 257-58 (1997) (reviewing judicial interpretations of the FTDA and concluding that courts
have given the dilution theory a newfound respect and are more willing to recognize dilution as a
trademark cause of action).
5. See infra Part II.A (discussing the FTDA and the reasons for its passage).
6. See Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, The New Wild West: Measuring and Proving Fame and
Dilution Under the FederalTrademark Dilution Act, 63 ALBANY L. REV. 201 (1999) (discussing
the problems associated with fame and dilution); see also, e.g., Westchester Media v. PRL USA
Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658 (5th Cir. 2000); Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports
News, 212 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 760 (2001); Avery Dennison Corp. v.
Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 1999); Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir.
1999); Ringling Bros.-Bamum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170
F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999).
7. See infra note 39 and accompanying text (finding that the protected trademarks must be
both famous and distinctive).
8. See infra Part II.C (analyzing the difference between the likelihood of dilution and actual
dilutidn).
9. See infra Part II (analyzing the difficulty for trademark owners to go after cybersquatters).
10. Congress stated:
Currently, the legal remedies available to trademark owners to prevent cyberpiracy are
both expensive and uncertain. Federal courts have generally found in favor of the
owner of a trademark where a similar or identical domain name is actively used in
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cybersquatters, Congress then passed the ACPA."1 Unlike the FTDA,
the ACPA does not require a trademark to be both distinctive and
famous in order to be protected. 12 Nor does the ACPA impose a finding
of actual dilution or likelihood of dilution. 13 The ACPA requires a less
stringent standard that protects the trademark if the domain name is
14
"identical or confusingly similar" to the distinctive mark.
The ACPA, however, only applies to cases involving unauthorized
use of protected trademarks with "bad faith intent to profit" from the
goodwill of the trademarks as domain names. 15 This means that an
owner of a distinctive and/or famous trademark has protection against
dilution use only in the form of a domain name. Trademark owners,
ironically, have no anti-dilution protection under the ACPA if the
defendant used a dilutive trademark in commerce, but did not register
the dilutive trademark as a domain name. Trademark owners once
again are forced back to the circus among the circuits because their only6
potential protection against the dilutive use is through the FTDA.'
Most trademark owners, however, will not be able to satisfy the

connection with a cyberpirate's Web site. The law is less settled, however, where a
cyberpirate has either registered the domain name and done nothing more, or where the
cyberpirate uses a significant variation on the trademark.
H.R. REP. No. 106-412, at 6 (1999); see also S. REP. No. 106-140, at 7 (1999). In addition,
Congress has said:
Current law does not expressly prohibit the act of cybersquatting... Trademark holders
are battling thousands of cases of cybersquatting each year, the vast majority of which
cannot be resolved through the dispute resolution policy set up by Internet domain
name registries. Instances of cybersquatting continue to grow each year because there
is no clear deterrent and little incentive for cybersquatters to discontinue their abusive
practices.
S. REP. No. 106-140, at 7.
11. Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 496 (2d Cir. 2000) ("IT]he
ACPA was passed to remedy the perceived shortcomings of applying the FTDA in cybersquatting
cases.").
12. See infra Part III.B (finding that the ACPA only requires the trademark to be distinctive or
famous in order to be protected).
13. See infra Part III.C (discussing the ACPA's requirement that the domain name be either
"identical or confusingly similar" to the distinctive mark).
14. See infra note 154 and accompanying text (discussing the "identical or confusingly
similar" requirement).
15. See infra Part II.E (reviewing the bad faith requirement).
16. See infra Part II (discussing the difficulty of trademark owners getting protection against
cybersquatters). Trademark owners under such circumstances cannot assert a trademark
infringement claim; while the offending use is dilutive, the offending mark is not likely to be
confused with the origin or source. See Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1236,
1239-41 (N.D. 11. 1996). The court explained that a plaintiff must show the likelihood of
confusion resulting from the defendant's use of the plaintiff's trademark as a domain name in
order to prevail. See id. at 1234.
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elements of proof under the FTDA because "fame" and "dilution"
within the meaning of the FTDA impose an extremely high burden of
proof. FTDA protection is available for very few trademarks. 17 In
other words, Congress has not fixed all of the shortcomings in the
8
FTDA.'
This Article will examine both the FTDA and the ACPA and how
Congress has created additional shortcomings with the passage of the
ACPA. Further, this Article will propose what should be done to
resolve some of the problems.' 9 Part II discusses briefly the legislative
history of the FTDA.2 ° Congress blamed the cybersquatters when it
passed the FTDA, but failed to cure the cybersquatting problem. 2 1 Part
II analyzes the shortcomings of the FTDA as exhibited in the expanding
disarray of judicial interpretations of distinctiveness, niche, fame, and
dilution. 22 Part III discusses the legislative history of the new ACPA,
illustrating a trend in congressional action on trademark-related
cyberlaw: blaming the cybersquatters instead of reflecting on the
problems with trademark dilution in both Internet and non-Internet
contexts. 23 Part III also analyzes the elements of the ACPA along with
recent legal interpretations of the new Act. 24 In addition, Part III
identifies the birth of new problems in various provisions of the ACPA
and suggests solutions to resolve these specific problems. 25 Part IV
discusses how the ACPA fails to fix the shortcomings associated with
the FTDA.2 6 Further, Part IV demonstrates how the ACPA creates two
different classes of protection among trademark owners depending on
where the trademark diluter committed the wrong. 27 One trademark
owner has an appropriate remedy because the diluter is operating on the
Internet while a second trademark owner has no remedy against similar
dilution as the diluter is operating in the brick and mortar world. The
Article concludes that there is a need for new trademark-related
cyberlaw to avoid the similar types of problems seen in both the FTDA

17. See infra notes 75-80 and accompanying text.
18. See infra Parts II.B-C (describing how circuit courts have analyzed the FTDA's
requirements in widely different ways).
19. See infra Part IV.
20. See infra Part I.A.
21. See infra Part II.
22. See infra Part H.
23. See infra Part III.A.
24. See infra Part HI.
25. See infra Part M.
26. See infra Part IV.
27. See infra Part IV.
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and the ACPA. 28 New trademark-related cyberlaw should address the
multiple facets of problems involving trademarks and domain names in
cyberspace; in addition, it must also avoid piecemeal, incoherent, and
inconsistent legislation that will hinder the growth of electronic
commerce. 29 Further, any such new cyberlaw must avoid the
appearance of an "e-preferred" remedy. 30 A defendant's conduct that is
legislated as illegal in cyberspace should also be deemed illegal outside
cyberspace. 3 1 Otherwise, trademark-related cyberlaw will create unfair
protection among trademark owners.
II.

THE FEDERAL TRADEMARK DILUTION ACT

A. CybersquattersMade Us Pass the FTDA
The Federal Trademark Dilution Act became federal anti-dilution law
on January 16, 1996.32 One of the reasons for the passage of the FTDA,
according to Senator Patrick Leahy, was to "help stem the use of
deceptive Internet addresses taken by those who are choosing marks
33
that are associated with the products and reputations of others."
Immediately after the enactment of the FTDA, several anti-dilution
lawsuits involving unauthorized use of "famous" trademarks as domain
names34 were successful. 35 The success did not last long. Soon,
28. See infra Part V.
29. See infra Part IV.
30. See infra Part IV.
31. See infra Part IV.
32. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 987 (1995)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c) (West 1998)).
33. 141 CONG. REC. S19,312-01 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995) (statement of Senator Patrick
Leahy); see also Panavision Int'l v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1326 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting
Senator Patrick Leahy's statement, "it is my hope that this anti-dilution statute can help stem the
use of deceptive Internet addresses taken by those who are choosing marks that are associated
with the products and reputations of others," as evidence of congressional intent to curb
cybersquatters with the FTDA). The Ninth Circuit, in PanavisionInternationalv. Toeppen, held
that Congress intended the FTDA to combat cybersquatting activities. The Ninth Circuit later
applied the FTDA again in another cybersquatting case. See Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton,
189 F.3d 868, 874-77 (9th Cir. 1999).
34. See Jennifer Golinveaux, What's In a Domain Name: Is "Cybersquatting" Trademark
Dilution?, 33 U.S.F. L. REv. 641, 642 (1999) (explaining the anatomy of a domain name).
35. See, e.g., Panavision Int'l, 141 F.3d at 1326-27 (holding defendant's registration of
plaintiffs trademarks as domain names diluted those marks); Teletech Customer Care Mgmt.,
Inc. v. Tele-Tech Co., Inc. 977 F. Supp. 1407, 1412-14 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (issuing preliminary
injunction against defendant's use of plaintiff's service mark "TeleTech" as a domain name in
violation of the FTDA); Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1239-41 (N.D. II. 1996)
(holding defendant's use of plaintiffs trademark INTERMATIC as intermatic.com violated the
FTDA); Hasbro, Inc. v. Internet Entm't Group, Ltd., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1479 (W.D. Wash.
Feb. 9, 1996) (enjoining defendant's use of the domain name candyland.com under the FTDA).

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 32

judicial interpretations of the nebulous concepts of fame and dilution
rendered an FTDA dilution claim against cybersquatters a difficult
claim to establish.3 6
B. CybersquattersCaused the FTDA To Be Ineffective: Fame Within a
Niche Market Is Not Enough-HeightenedDistinctiveness Is Also
Required
The FTDA provides the owner of "a famous mark.., an injunction
against another person's commercial use in commerce of a mark or
trade name, if such use begins after the mark has become famous and
causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the famous mark. 37 Though
the statutory language provides this protection for the owner of "a
famous mark, ' 38 at least one circuit court has interpreted the FTDA to
require marks to be both "distinctive and famous." 39 This suggests that
ownership of a famous trademark is not enough to assert a claim against
cybersquatters under the FTDA. 40 The protected trademark must be
both famous and distinctive. 4 1 Under such a requirement, trademarks
like AMERICAN, NATIONAL, FEDERATED, UNITED, ACME,
MERIT, and ACE, though famous, may be deemed not distinctive
enough for protection under the FTDA.42 Indeed, the Second Circuit, in
Nabisco v. PF Brands, Inc., 4 3 noted that these marks are "of the
common or quality-claiming or prominence-claiming type," and that the
FTDA does not extend the broad protection privilege to "such common,
albeit famous, marks . . . ."44 Within this line of judicial interpretation,
cybersquatters gain a royalty-free license to use AMERICAN,

36. See infra Part II.B; see also Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 874-77 (9th
Cir. 1999) (holding the trademarks AVERY and DENNISON not famous for protection under the
FTDA).
37. 15 U.S.C.A. § I I25(c)(l) (West 1998).
38. See id.
39. Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 216 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding textual support
for its imposition of distinctiveness as a required statutory element). The court in Nabisco, Inc. v.
PF Brands, Inc. relied on the statute's phrases that the use of the junior mark causes "dilution of
the distinctive quality of the [senior] mark," and the statute requires an assessment of "whether
the mark is distinctive and famous." Id.
40. See id.
41. See id. at 215 (interpreting the FTDA to require both famous and distinctive).
42. See id. at 216.
43. Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999).
44. Id. at216.
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NATIONAL, FEDERATED, UNITED, ACME, MERIT, and ACE4 5 as
domain names and have no fear of liability under the FTDA.46
Not only does the Second Circuit in Nabisco impose distinctiveness
as an element of proof under the FTDA, it requires a heightened
distinctiveness. 47 The Nabisco court held that the anti-dilution
protection is reserved for highly distinctive marks that are entirely "the
product of the imagination and evoke no associations with human
experience that relate intrinsically to the product., 48 Trademarks that
have acquired distinctiveness through years of extensive use in
commerce are not eligible for protection under the FTDA.49
Under trademark law, distinctiveness is an important concept that
categorizes trademarks relative to their strengths or weaknesses 50 and
45. Indeed, cybersquatters can attempt to rely on the Nabisco court's comments on trademarks
such as "American Airlines, American Tobacco Company, British Airways, Federated
Department Stores, Allied Stores and First National Bank of whatever" as famous, but not
distinctive within the meaning of the FTDA. Id. at 227-28.
46. Id. at 216 ("The requirement of distinctiveness is furthermore an important limitation. A
mark that, notwithstanding its fame, has no distinctiveness is lacking the very attribute that the
antidilution statute seeks to protect."). The Second Circuit later perceived the shortcomings of
the FTDA in cybersquatting dilution cases and directly applied the ACPA to a cybersquatting
case that was initially decided by the district court solely under the FTDA. See Sporty's Farm
L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 495 (2d Cir. 2000).
47. According to the Second Circuit, the five elements are: (1) the senior mark must be
famous; (2) the senior mark must be distinctive; (3) the junior use must be a commercial use in
commerce; (4) the junior mark use must begin after the senior mark has become famous; and
(5) the junior mark must cause dilution of the distinctive quality of the senior mark. Nabisco, 191
F.3d at 215. The Second Circuit believed that the "fame" factor in elements (1) and (4) should be
treated in their ordinary English language meaning. Id. The Second Circuit saw no ambiguity
with the meaning of "fame" and thus far has not offered any further discussion on "fame." Id.
The Second Circuit also recognized that in addition to being a statutory element, distinctiveness
plays an important role in the inquiry of whether the use of the junior mark will have a diluting
effect on the distinctiveness of the senior mark. Id. at 217. The more distinctive the senior mark,
the greater the protection provided against dilution. Id. Conversely, the less distinctive the senior
mark, the weaker the protection available against dilution. Id.
48. id. at 216. The court stated:
The strongest protection of the trademark laws is reserved for these most highly
distinctive marks .... The anti-dilution statute seeks to guarantee exclusivity not only
in cases where confusion would occur but throughout the realms of commerce. Many
famous marks are of the common or quality-claiming or prominence-claiming
type-such as American, National, Federal, Federated, First, United, Acme, Merit &'
Ace. It seems most unlikely that the statute contemplates allowing the holders of such
common, albeit famous, marks to exclude all new entrants. That is why the statute
grants that privilege only to holders of distinctive marks.
Id.
49. See id.
50. The classification of trademarks on the distinctiveness scale has much inherent ambiguity
and complexity "because a term that is in one category for a particular product may be in quite a
different one for another, because a term may shift from one category to another in light of
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provides protection to trademarks in accordance with their strength
levels. 5 1 Trademarks are classified as generic, descriptive, suggestive,
and arbitrary or fanciful.5 2 Generally, generic marks have no
distinctiveness and are not entitled to protection because they are words
that name the species or object to which the marks apply, 53 and
protection granted to such words would deprive competitors of any
common use of the words. 54 Descriptive marks are words or phrases
that describe the product, its attributes or claims. 55 Such marks are also
not entitled to protection unless they have acquired secondary meaning,
that is, through use and advertisement, the descriptive mark has become
a source identifier in the mind of the consuming public. 56 Suggestive
marks are words or phrases laden with intimation that demand the
consuming public do some mental exercise to conjure the meaning or
association between the marks and products. 57 Suggestive marks are
protected without a showing of "secondary meaning"; 58 however, they
differences in usage through time, because a term may have one meaning to one group of users
and a different one to others, and because the same term may be put to different uses with respect
to a single product." Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir.
1976) (holding that the term "safari" was not a generic term for certain products, and thus
plaintiff had a claim for infringement of registered trademarks).
51. See id.
52. See Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 9; see also Otokoyama Co. Ltd. v. Wine of Japan Imp., Inc.,
175 F.3d 266, 270 (2d Cir. 1999).
53. Invented words that became too successful may be deemed generic and lose all trademark
protections. See, e.g., King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577 (2d Cir.
1963) (THERMOS); DuPont Cellophane Co., Inc. v. Waxed Prods. Co., Inc., 85 F.2d 75 (2d Cir.
1936) (CELLOPHANE), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 601 (1936), and cert. denied, 304 U.S. 575
(1938); Bayer Co., Inc. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (ASPIRIN); Haughton
Elevator Co. v. Seeberger, 85 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 80 (Comm. Pat. & T.M. Apr. 3, 1950)
(ESCALATOR).
54. Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 215 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that CAR is a
generic word and no one can claim the exclusive right to use CAR as a trademark for cars); see
also American Cyanamid Corp. v. Connaught Labs., Inc., 800 F.2d 306 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding
that "Hib" was a generic term, and therefore the use of the trademark HIBVAX did not infringe
on the trademark HIB-IMUNE).
55. See, e.g., Papercutter, Inc. v. Fay's Drug Co., Inc., 900 F.2d 558 (2d Cir. 1990) (PAPER
CUTTER paper ornaments); W.E. Bassett Co. v. Revlon, Inc., 354 F.2d 868 (2d Cir. 1966)
(TRIM cuticle trimmer).
56. Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 215; see also Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 10 (stating that the
descriptive mark must be shown to be distinctive, which requires "proof of substantially exclusive
and continuous use of the mark applied to the applicant's goods for five years preceding the
application").
57. See, e.g., American Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson Chem. Co., Inc., 589 F.2d 103 (2d Cir.
1978) (ROACH MOTEL for insect trap); Douglas Lab. Corp. v. Copper Tan, Inc., 210 F.2d 453
(2d Cir.) (COPPERTONE for suntan lotion), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 968 (1954); Playboy Entm't,
Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publ'g, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 414 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (PLAYBOY for magazine),
affid, 687 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1982).
58. Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 215; see also Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 10.
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do not enjoy the highest level of trademark protection because "they
seek to suggest the qualities of the product.- 59 Arbitrary or fanciful
trademarks are inherently distinctive words; 60 there is no logical
relationship1 between such marks and the products or services bearing
6
the marks.
Within the category of arbitrary or fanciful marks, the Nabisco court
observes, "there is still a substantial range of distinctiveness. Some
marks may qualify as arbitrary because they have no logical relationship
to the product, but nonetheless have a low level of distinctiveness
because they are common." 62 For example, the trademark AMERICAN
for airline services is qualified as arbitrary, but it possesses no
distinctiveness because it is a common word.63 Under the Nabisco
rationale, the owner of the trademark AMERICAN for airline services
has no protection under the FTDA. 64
On the other end of the judicial polarization, the First, Third, and
Ninth Circuits 65 neither impose a finding of heightened distinctiveness
nor interpret distinctiveness as a statutory element under the FTDA. 66
These circuits require a mark to possess either inherent or acquired
distinctiveness. 67 For example, the trademark THE SPORTING NEWS
is not inherently distinctive, but it has acquired distinctiveness or
68
secondary meaning over time in the marketplace.

59. Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 215.
60. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Rakow, 739 F. Supp. 116, 117 (W.D.N.Y. 1989) ("The Kodak
trademark is perhaps one of the strongest and most distinctive trademarks in this country, if not in
the world."); Horizon Fin., F.A. v. Horizon Bancorporation, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1696 (E.D. Pa.
Feb. 3, 1987) (holding that the HORIZON trademark is arbitrary for banking services).
61. Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 216 ("A mark is arbitrary or fanciful if there is no logical relationship
whatsoever between the mark and the product on which it is used.").
62. Id.
63. See id. at 227-28.
64. See id. at 216, 227-28 (delineating between famousness and distinctiveness determinations
under the FTDA); see also supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text (discussing other famous
trademarks that may not have sufficient distinctiveness to be protected under the FTDA).
65. See, e.g., Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports News, 212 F.3d 157, 167 (3d
Cir. 2000) (eschewing individualized tests of fame and distinctiveness); Avery Dennison Corp. v.
Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 877 (9th Cir. 1999) (describing the historical basis for determining
distinctiveness); I.P. Lund Trading v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 42 (1st Cir. 1998) (exploring the
concept of secondary meaning and distinctiveness).
66. Times Mirror Magazines, 212 F.3d at 167 ("[W]e are not persuaded that a mark be subject
to separate tests for fame and distinctiveness."); Avery Dennison, 189 F.3d at 877 ("We reject
Appellants' argument that the distinctiveness required for famousness under the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act is inherent, not merely acquired distinctiveness."); LP. Lund Trading,
163 F.3d at 47 (holding a famous mark is by necessity distinctive).
67. See, e.g., Avery Dennison, 189 F.3d at 877.
68. Times Mirror Magazines, 212 F.3d at 165-66 (finding the plaintiff has presented evidence
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To evaluate whether a mark has acquired distinctiveness or secondary
meaning, courts consider factors such as the "length or exclusivity of
use of the mark," the size or prominence of the plaintiff's enterprise,
"the existence of substantial ddvertising by the plaintiff," the product's
established place in the market,69 and proof of intentional copying. 70 A
strong showing of evidence 7 1 supporting these factors will demonstrate
that a non-inherently distinctive trademark has gained secondary
72
meaning and a high degree of distinctiveness in its market.
In the First, Third, and Ninth Circuits, however, proof of "famous" is
the only statutory element necessary for a mark to be protected under
the FTDA. These circuits believe that famousness requires a showing
greater than distinctiveness and thus a "famous" mark is by necessity
also "distinctive." 73 Such courts would find a4 separate test for
7
"distinctiveness" to be duplicative of "famousness.
to support that THE SPORTING NEWS trademark has acquired secondary meaning through
years of extensive use in commerce and the plaintiff has expended millions of dollars in
advertisement and promotion of their trademark in the media).
69. I.P. Lund Trading v. Kohler Co., 118 F. Supp. 2d 92, 113 (D. Mass. 2000) (requiring
evidence of the plaintiffs market share for the inquiry of "the product's established place in the
market").
70. Times MirrorMagazines, 212 F.3d at 165; IP. Lund Trading, 163 F.3d at 41-43; see also
Avery Dennison, 189 F.3d at 876 (noting factors for secondary meaning consideration include:
(1) whether actual purchasers associate the mark with the plaintiff; (2) the degree and manner of
the plaintiffs advertising; (3) the length and manner of the plaintiff's use of the mark; and
(4) whether the plaintiff's use of the mark has been exclusive (citing Clamp Mfg. Co. v. Enco
Mfg. Co., 870 F.2d 512, 517 (9th Cir. 1989))).
71. Courts have also observed that proof of secondary meaning is "a difficult empirical
inquiry which a factfinder must undertake." Avery Dennison, 189 F.3d at 876 (citing Taco
Cabana Int'l, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113, 1119-20 & n.7 (5th Cir. 1991), aff'd, 505
U.S. 763 (1992)).
72. Times MirrorMagazines, 212 F.3d at 166.
73. Id. at 168 ("Having decided that Times Mirror has proved that its mark had gained
secondary meaning and a high degree of distinctiveness in the market, there is no necessity for
proving an additional test of distinctiveness."); Avery Dennison, 189 F.3d at 877 ("famousness
requires a showing greater than mere distinctiveness"); I.P. Lund Trading, 163 F.3d at 47; see
also N. Light Tech., Inc. v. N. Lights Club, 97 F. Supp. 2d 96, 115 n.22 (D. Mass. 2000).
74. Professor J. Thomas McCarthy explains the legislative history behind the FTDA on
"distinctive and famous":
The 1987 Trademark Review Commission Report, the genesis of the language
contained in the 1996 federal Act, said that the dual mention of both "distinctive and
famous" in the introduction to the list of factors was inserted to emphasize the policy
goal that to be protected, a mark had to be truly prominent and renowned. The doublebarreled language "distinctive and famous" reflected the goal that protection should be
confined to marks "which are both distinctive, as established by federal registration at a
minimum, and famous, as established by separate evidence." The Commission
inserted the term "distinctive" as hyperbole to emphasize the requirement that the mark
be registered, for without inherent or acquired distinctiveness, the designation would
not have been a mark which should have been federally registered in the first place.
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The "famous" test, nevertheless, is difficult to establish 75 because
there are only a handful of cases where "famous" has been proven for a
claim under the FTDA.7 6 To be deemed "famous" within the meaning
of the FTDA, a mark must be "truly prominent" and "renowned., 77 The
difficulty with a fame based standard rests on how famous a mark
should be and how to demonstrate that a mark is famous. Some courts
have granted trademarks known only in their niche market a famous
status, if the offending trademarks are also used in the same or a related
niche market. 78 In circumstances where the plaintiff and the defendant
are not in the same or related niche market, courts require the plaintiff
to show that its trademark is known beyond its customer base, that is,

The Trademark Review Commission Report reveals that the Commission saw
distinctiveness and fame as two sides of the same evidentiary coin which requires
widespread and extensive customer recognition of the plaintiff's mark. However,
when in the 1995 House amendment, the requirement of federal registration was
dropped from the Bill, Congress neglected to also drop the mention of "distinctive"
introducing the list of factors. Thus, the word "distinctive" was left floating in the
statute, unmoored to either any statutory requirement or underlying policy goal.
J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 24:91 (4th
ed. 1999).
75. I.P. Lund Trading, 163 F.3d at 47 (requiring that famous marks have "national renown"
and suggesting that a consumer survey is helpful evidence to establish fame).
76. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 955
F. Supp. 605, 612 (E.D. Va. 1997) (noting that survey evidence demonstrated that over forty
percent of respondents in the United States associated the mark THE GREATEST SHOW ON
EARTH with Ringling Brothers' circus), aff'd, 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999).
77. Avery Dennison, 189 F.3d at 875 (quoting I.P. Lund, 163 F.3d at 46) (citing MCCARTHY,
supra note 74, § 24.91).
78. Times Mirror Magazines, 212 F.3d at 166 (finding that THE SPORTING NEWS
trademark was famous in the sports periodicals market because both plaintiff and defendant
operate in a common market and the trademark has acquired secondary meaning and a high
degree of distinctiveness in its market); Syndicate Sales, Inc. v. Hampshire Paper Corp., 192 F.3d
633, 640-41 (7th Cir. 1999) (addressing the niche market debate and holding that the district court
erred in concluding the trade dress for a plastic basket used for floral bouquets was not famous
based solely on the niche-market status of the baskets); see also Wash. Speakers Bureau, Inc. v.
Leading Auths., Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 488, 503-04 (E.D. Va. 1999) (holding fame can be adequate
only if the "diluting uses are directed narrowly at the same market segment"); Teletech Customer
Care Mgmt., Inc. v. Tele-Tech Co., 977 F. Supp. 1407, 1413 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (holding fame in a
narrow market segment was present in a case where the plaintiff "[is] the largest provider of
integrated telephone and Internet customer care worldwide" and thus satisfied the threshold
requirement under the FTDA). See generally Christopher R. Perry, Note, Trademarks As
Commodities: The "Famous" Roadblock to Applying Trademark Dilution Law in Cyberspace, 32
CONN. L. RE V. 1127, 1148 (2000) (criticizing courts that have stretched the "famous"
requirement to marks that are not nationally known).
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the plaintiff's mark is known in the defendant's market. 79 This leaves
80
many known but not "famous" marks without anti-dilutive protection.
C. CybersquattersCausedthe Creation of Likelihood of Dilution
Versus Actual Dilution
The FTDA and its legislative history provide no guidance on dilution
or how to determine dilution. 8 1 The FTDA provides a sparse definition
of dilution: "the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify
and distinguish goods or services regardless of the presence or absence
of competition between the owner of the famous mark and other parties,
or the likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception." 82 This leads to a
disarray of interpretations of dilution. 83 Some courts hold dilution as
the "actual lessening of the senior mark's selling power" and demand a
showing of "actual dilution" harm to the famous mark due to dilutive
use. 84 Other courts believe dilution to be the lessening of the distinctive

79. Avery Dennison, 189 F.3d at 878 (finding the plaintiff's failure to present evidence
demonstrates that its trademarks do not possess any degree of recognition among Internet users or
that plaintiff and defendant share overlapping channels of trade); see also Michael Caruso & Co.
v. Estefan Enters. Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1454, 1463 (S.D. Fla.) (explaining the concept of inherent
distinctiveness), aff'd, 166 F.3d 353 (11th Cir. 1998); King of the Mountain Sports, Inc. v.
Chrysler Corp., 968 F. Supp. 568, 578 (D. Colo. 1997) (finding that plaintiff failed to raise a
genuine issue of fact as to whether its marks were famous), affd, 185 F.3d 1084 (10th Cir. 1999);
Golden Bear Int'l, Inc. v. Bear U.S.A., Inc., 969 F. Supp. 742, 749 (N.D. Ga. 1996) (describing a
close case where plaintiff failed to establish success on the merits).
80. See, e.g., Avery Dennison, 189 F.3d at 877-79 (finding the plaintiff failed to show that its
trademarks AVERY and DENNISON are famous within the meaning of the FrDA).
81. See Gregg Duffey, Trademark Dilution Under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of
1995: You've Come A Long Way Baby-Too Far, Maybe?, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 133, 142 (1997)
(summarizing congressional intent regarding the FTDA); Nguyen, supra note 6, at 232-39
(discussing how dilution should be measured); Routh, supra note 4, at 277-81 (providing and
analyzing the legislative history of the FTDA).
82. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994).
83. See, e.g., Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658, 670-71 (5th Cir.
2000) (differentiating between the likelihood and cause of dilution); Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands,
Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 217-22 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding, through a ten-factor test, that analogous
products may cause dilution); Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports News, 212 F.3d
167, 168 (3d Cir. 1999) (clarifying the notion of blurring); Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey
Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 452 (4th Cir. 1999) (discussing
dilution as a blurring of a mark's distinctiveness).
84. Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 670-71; Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 452.
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quality of the famous mark,8 5 require a "likelihood of dilution"
standard,86 and impose a complex ten-factor test for such a finding.8 7
The Fourth Circuit, in a case involving whether the use of THE
GREATEST SNOW ON EARTH by the defendant Utah Department of
Travel Development in connection with Utah tourism services diluted
plaintiff Ringling Brothers-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows'
trademark THE GREATEST SHOW ON EARTH, led the first judicial
effort at the appellate level to formulate a standard for proving dilution
under the FTDA.88 The Fourth Circuit interpreted the FTDA to provide
a "remedy only for actual, consummated dilution and not for the mere
'likelihood of dilution."' 89 The Fifth Circuit had recently joined the
Fourth Circuit in adopting the actual dilution test. 9° These circuits
asserted that textual support for their interpretation is found in the
FTDA definition of dilution as "the lessening of the capacity of a
famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services," because
such definition makes plain that "the end harm at which it is aimed is a
mark's selling power, not its 'distinctiveness' as such." 9 1 In addition,
the FTDA prohibits any commercial use of a famous mark that "causes
dilution." 92 The present tense of the verb supports an actual harm
standard. 93 Further, the FTDA does not expressly incorporate the
"likelihood of dilution" standard as some states' anti-dilution statutes
do.

94

85. See Avery Dennison, 189 F.3d at 868; I.P. Lund Trading v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27 (1st
Cir. 1998); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (defining dilution).
86. Times Mirror Magazines, 212 F.3d at 168 (modifying the Nabisco analysis by applying a
likelihood of dilution test that includes factors such as "actual confusion and likelihood of
confusion, shared customers and geographic isolation, the adjectival quality of the junior use, and
the interrelated factors of duration of the junior use, harm to the junior user, and delay by the
senior user in bringing the action" (quoting Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 228)).
87. Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 217-22 (formulating and applying ten factors for dilution test); see
also Federal Express Corp. v. Federal Espresso, Inc., 201 F.3d 168, 176 (2d Cir. 2000)
(reiterating application of the ten-factor test as set forth in Nabisco). See infra notes 110-11 and
accompanying text for a list of the elements comprising the ten-factor test.
88. Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 458; see also Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 670-71
(endorsing the Fourth Circuit's holding that "the FTDA requires proof of actual harm since this
standard best accords with the plain meaning of the statute").
89. Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 458.
90. Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 670-71.
91. Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 458; see also Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 670-71.
92. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (1994).
93. Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 670.
94. See id.; see also Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 461 ("Unlike the state antidilution statutes
which provide only injunctive relief, reflecting their sole focus on prevention of future harm, the
federal Act provides that where willful conduct is shown, both compensatory and restitutionary
relief may be awarded-for necessarily consummated economic harm.").
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The Second Circuit in Nabisco, on the other end of the spectrum of
dilution, rejected the Fourth Circuit's actual dilution standard.9 5 The
Second Circuit noted that the Fourth Circuit seems to offer two
positions on actual dilution. 96 The first and narrow position is that
courts may rely only on evidence of "actual loss of revenues" or the
"skillfully constructed consumer survey." 97 The other position is "not
only that dilution be proved by a showing of lost revenues or surveys
but also that the junior [trademark] be already established in the
98
marketplace before the senior [trademark] could seek an injunction."
Such positions impose unwarranted limitations on methods of proof
in trademark cases. 99 Indeed, proof of actual loss of revenue is
inappropriate because the owner of a famous mark with continually
growing success might never be able to show a decrease of revenues
despite the use of the junior mark diluting the distinctiveness of the
famous mark. 00 Moreover, loss of revenue is speculative and it is
difficult to show that the loss is due to the dilution of the senior mark by
the junior mark's use. 10 1 In addition, to wait for the junior mark to be
established in the marketplace before the owner of the senior mark can
seek injunctive relief under the FTDA would bar the owner from
asserting any immediate and irreparable harm and subject the owner to
10 2
the defenses of laches and failure to prosecute or police its mark.
Proof of actual dilution through a consumer survey is generally
expensive, time-consuming, and may be subject to manipulation if the
consumer survey is not carefully conducted in accordance with
03
acceptable methodology. 1
The Second Circuit also rejected the dilution test proposed by Judge
Sweet in his concurring opinion in Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Toyota
Motor Sales' 4 because the test does not encompass all of the factors
that might bear on the issue of dilution. 10 5 In fact, the Second Circuit
95. Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 223-24 (2d Cir. 1999).
96. Id. at 223.
97. Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 465.
98. Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 224.
99. See id. at 223.
100. See id. at 223-24 (rejecting the Ringling Bros. interpretation of the FTDA on proof of
actual, consummated harm).
101. Seeid.at224.
102. See id. at 224-25.
103. Id. at 224.
104. Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A. Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1032-40 (2d
Cir. 1989) (Sweet, J., concurring) (describing a test for dilution that includes similarity, consumer
sophistication, renown of the mark, and predatory intent).
105. See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 227-28.
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had not adopted the Mead Data test prior to the enactment of the
FTDA. 10 6 Facing the new task of interpreting the FTDA, the Second
Circuit expressed its reluctance to formulate a fixed-factor test as it
observed that "[i]t is not yet entirely clear how courts should determine
whether a junior use causes a senior mark to suffer dilution."' 0 7 Part of
its reluctance is the timing of a fixed-factor test for dilution since the
FTDA was enacted just a few years ago and the collective judicial
experience with the FTDA is still in a relatively early stage.'0 8 The
Second Circuit, nevertheless, adopted a ten-factor test for dilution under
the FTDA.'09
The ten-factor dilution test poses a major challenge to a successful
claim under the FTDA. l l0 The ten factors that comprise the test are:
(1) the distinctiveness of the senior mark; (2) the similarity of the
marks; (3) the proximity of the products and likelihood of bridging the
gap; (4) the close interdependent relationship among the three preceding
factors; (5) the extent of overlap among consumers of the senior user's
products and the junior user's products; (6) the sophistication of the
consumers; (7) actual confusion; (8) whether the senior user's mark is
descriptive of the junior use; (9) whether the senior user acted with
reasonable promptness in seeking to protect its mark from the alleged
dilution by the junior user; and (10) whether the senior user has been lax
in the past in taking steps to protect its mark against dilution by
1
others. I I
On an initial glance such a test seems more appropriate than the
actual, consummated dilution test; however, the complex factor test will
be quite expensive to prove.112 In addition, with the present disarray in
judicial interpretations of fame, distinctiveness, and dilution, a
trademark owner who would like to bring a claim under the FTDA faces
enormous uncertainty and an extremely high burden of proof as to these
elements. Further, trademark owners face an acute problem in
cybersquatting cases because some cybersquatters do not use domain
names as trademarks and thus share no market or channel of trade with

106. See id. at 227 n.8.
107. Id. at 217.
108. See id.
109. Id,at 217-22.
110. See Federal Express Corp. v. Federal Espresso, Inc., 201 F.3d 168, 174-78 (2d Cir.
2000).
ll. See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 217-22. In a subsequent case, the Second Circuit applied the
ten factors and affirmed the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction. See Federal
Express, 201 F.3d at 177-78.
112. See Federal Express, 201 F.3d at 174-78.
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the owners of the known marks."13 This renders the FTDA completely
ineffective. Moreover, the trademark owners cannot look to traditional
trademark infringement. 114
III.

THE ANTICYBERSQUATTING CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT

A. The CybersquattersAre At It Again
Less than four years after the enactment of the FTDA, Congress
passed the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act. 1 5
On
November 29, 1999, President Clinton signed into law an omnibus
budget bill that included the ACPA. 116 The ACPA amends the
Trademark Act of 1946 (also known as the Lanham Act), adding a new
cause of action to Section 43117 and providing a specific federal remedy
against the cybersquatting of trademarks. 118 Congress grouped
activities such as "bad faith and abusive registration of distinctive marks
as Internet domain names with the intent to profit from the goodwill
119
associated with such marks" as "cybersquatting."
113. See infra notes 130-34 and accompanying text (discussing Congressional concern about
the ability of cybersquatters to insulate themselves from liability under the FTDA).
114. In addition, trademark owners cannot look to traditional trademark infringement under
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act against cybersquatting activities because that section of the
Lanham Act requires "use" of the trademark. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994 & West Supp.
2000). Cybersquatters do not use the domain names; rather, they hold trademarks hostage as
domain names. Thus, a likelihood of confusion as to origin or source is difficult to establish
against cybersquatters.
115. On June 21, 1999, Senator Spencer Abraham introduced the Anticybersquatting
Consumer Protection Act ("S. 1255"). On July 29, 1999, Senator Orrin Hatch introduced the
Domain Name Piracy Prevention Act of 1999 ("S. 1461"). On August 5, 1999, the Senate passed
S. 1255 and amended it to incorporate S. 1461. On October 26, 1999, an amended version of that
bill passed the House in lieu of the House's own version that was introduced earlier by
Representative James Rogan. Congress then incorporated the legislation into its omnibus
spending bill (H.R. 3194). See Neil L. Martin, Note, The Anticybersquatting Consumer
Protection Act: Empowering Trademark Owners, But Not the Last Word on Domain Name
Disputes, 25 J. CORP. L. 591, 591 n.4 (2000) (describing the legislative history of the ACPA);
Olivia Maria Baratter & Dana L. Hanaman, 8 TULANE J. INT'L & CORP. L. 325, 359-61 (2000)
(discussing the legislative history of the ACPA); see also http://thomas.luc.gov/cgi-bin/ (last
visited Apr. 10, 2000) (providing bill summary and status of the ACPA in the 106th Congress).
The President signed the bill into law on November 29, 1999. Pub. Law No. 106-113, § 3010
(1999).
116. S.REP. No. 106-140, at 19 (1999).
117. The new section 43(d) is the ACPA. Section 43(c) is the codified FTDA. Section 43(a)
of the Lanham Act is generally applied in trademark infringement and unfair competition cases.
See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1125(a), (c), (d) (West 1996 & Supp. 2000).
118. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d).
119. S.REP. No. 106-140, at 4; see also Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportman's Mkt., Inc., 202
F.3d 489, 495 (2d Cir. 2000) (defining cybersquatting as activity where a non-trademark holder
registers well-known domain names solely for the purpose of selling the names back to the
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The ACPA prohibits the registration of, trafficking in, 120 or the use of
a domain name with a bad faith intent to profit from the goodwill of a
distinctive or famous mark. 12 1 The owner of such a mark must prove
that, in the case of a distinctive trademark, at the time of registration the
domain name is either identical or confusingly similar to the distinctive
mark. 122 In the case of a famous trademark, the owner must prove that
the domain name is identical to, confusingly similar to, or dilutive of the
famous mark 123 at the time the domain name was registered. 124 The
ACPA provides an injunctive remedy against all domain names
registered before, on, or after November 29, 1999.125 Further, the
ACPA provides both damages 26 and injunctive relief against all
infringing or diluting domain names registered after the enactment

original trademark owners).
120. "Traffics in" refers to transactions that include "sales, purchases, loans, pledges, licenses,
exchanges or currency, and any other transfer for consideration or receipt in exchange for
consideration." 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d)(1)(E).
121. See 15 U.S.C.A § 1125(d)(l)(A) or section 43(d) of the Lanham Act which provides:
A person shall be liable in a civil action by the owner of a mark, including a personal
name which is protected as a mark under this section, if without regard to the goods or
services of the parties, that person(i) has a bad faith intent to profit from that mark, including a personal name which is
protected as a mark under this section; and
(ii) registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name that (I) in the case of a mark that is distinctive at the time of registration of the
domain name, is identical or confusingly similar to that mark;
(II) in the case of a famous mark that is famous at the time of registration of the
domain name, is identical or confusingly similar to or dilutive of that mark; ....
15 U.S.C.A. § 125(d)(l)(A) (West Supp. 2000).
122. The ACPA distinguishes between distinctive and famous marks by specifying different
liability for distinctive and famous marks. Cello Holdings, L.L.C. and Cello Music & Film Sys.,
Inc. v. Lawrence-Dahl Co., 89 F. Supp. 2d 464, 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
123. Id.
124. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d) (West Supp. 2000).
125. See Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 500 (2d Cir. 2000)
(holding damages were not available because the domain name sportys.com was registered prior
to the passage of the ACPA); see also Elizabeth Robison Martin, Note, "Too Famous to Live
Long!" The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act Sets Its Sights to Eliminate
Cybersquatter Opportunistic Claims on Domain Names, 31 ST. MARY'S L.J. 797, 842 (2000)
(suggesting that remedies under the ACPA and FTDA should be upgraded to deter cybersquatting
activities).
126. Section 35 of the Lanham Act was amended to include a new provision on statutory
damages:
(d) In a case involving a violation of section 43(d)(1), the plaintiff may elect, at any
time before final judgment is rendered by the trial court, to recover, instead of actual
damages and profits, an award of statutory damages in the amount of not less than
$1,000 and not more than $100,000 per domain name, as the court considers just.
15 U.S.C.A. § 1117(d) (West Supp. 2000).
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date. 127 The ACPA also allows courts to "order the forfeiture or
cancellation of the domain name or the transfer of the domain name to
the owner of the mark,"' 128 if the domain name was "registered before,
29
on, or after the date of the enactment" of the ACPA. 1
The legislative history of the ACPA shows that the Act was passed
because "the cybersquatters have become increasingly sophisticated as
the [FTDA] case law developed and now take the necessary precautions
to insulate themselves from liability."' 130 Congress believed that
cybersquatters had invented new ways of trafficking domain names to
avoid any liability under trademark dilution law.131 In his introduction
of a bill that was the precursor to the ACPA, Senator Orrin Hatch
denounced cybersquatting or cyberpiracy as "fraud, deception, and the
bad faith trading on the goodwill of others .... Unauthorized uses of
others' marks undercut the market by eroding consumer confidence and
132
the communicative value of the brand names we all rely on."'
Likewise, the Senate Committee Report condemned cyberpiracy
because it causes consumer confusion as to the source of goods and
services on the Internet; impairs the growth of electronic commerce;
deprives trademark owners of revenues derived from, and goodwill
associated with, their trademarks; and imposes enormous burdens on
trademark owners to protect and police their trademarks on the

127. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d) (West Supp. 2000).
128. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d)(2)(D)(i) (West Supp. 2000). This remedy is the only
available remedy for in rem jurisdiction. See infra Part III.F (discussing in rem jurisdiction
provisions of the ACPA).
129. See Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 3010, 113 Stat. 1531-543 (2000); see also Sporty's Farm,
202 F.3d at 500 (noting that under the ACPA damages can be awarded for violations of the Act,
but that they are not "available with respect to the registration, trafficking, or use of a domain
name that occurs before the date of the enactment of this Act").
130. S.REP. No. 106-140, at 7 (1999). Indeed, the Senate expressed its view on this issue:
While the [FTDA] has been useful in pursuing cybersquatters, cybersquatters have
become increasingly sophisticated as the case law has developed and now take the
necessary precautions to insulate themselves from liability. For example, many
cybersquatters are now careful to no longer offer the domain name for sale in any
manner that could implicate liability under existing trademark dilution case law. And,
in cases of warehousing and trafficking in domain names, courts have sometimes
declined to provide assistance to trademark holders, leaving them without adequate and
effective judicial remedies. This uncertainty as to the trademark law's application to
the Internet has produced inconsistent judicial decisions and created extensive
monitoring obligations, unnecessary legal costs, and uncertainty for consumers and
trademark owners alike.
Id.; see also Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 495 (quoting S. REP. No. 106-140, at 7).
131. S.REP. No. 106-140, at 7.
132. 145 CONG. REC. S9,749 (daily ed. July 29, 1999) (statement of Senator Hatch).
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Internet. 133 Without admitting how the poorly drafted FTDA has led to
the disarray of judicial interpretations of the Act within a short period of
four years that have rendered a dilution claim exceedingly difficult to
prove, Congress blamed the shortcomings of the FTDA on
cybersquatters. 134 Courts conveniently believe in such admonitions and
agree that the ACPA was passed "to remedy the perceived shortcomings
of applying the FTDA in cybersquatting cases."'1 35 In so doing, courts
ignore the circus of circuit interpretations of the FTDA as demonstrated
136
in Section II above.
Within four months of the enactment of the ACPA, courts embraced
it as "a particularly good fit" with cybersquatting cases that were
previously brought under the FTDA. 137 Indeed, the Second Circuit, in
Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Market, Inc., 138 directly applied
the ACPA without remand, affirming a federal trademark dilution
judgment entered before the ACPA was passed. 139 This suggests that
more litigation involving cybersquatting of protected trademarks as
domain names will quickly increase in the immediate future. As
analyzed below, the ACPA does not overcome all the shortcomings of
the FTDA and gives birth to a new set of problems that will frustrate
trademark owners and litigants.
B. Distinctive or Famous
The ACPA makes it easier for an owner of a trademark to assert a
0
claim against a cybersquatter than a dilution claim under the FTDA.14

133. S. REP. No. 106-140, at 12. Congress stated that:
[Cyberpiracy] harms the public by causing consumer fraud and public confusion as to
the true source or sponsorship of goods or services, by impairing electronic commerce,
by depriving trademark owners of substantial revenues and consumer goodwill, and by
placing unreasonable, intolerable, and overwhelming burdens on trademark owners in
protecting their own marks.
Id.
134. S.REP. No. 106-140, at 7; Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 495 (quoting S. REP. NO. 106-140,
at 7).
135. Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 496.
136. See supra Part II (discussing how judicial interpretations of famousness and dilution
rendered an FTDA dilution claim against cybersquatters difficult to establish).
137. Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 497.
138. Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 500 (2nd Cir. 2000).
139. Id. at 497.
140. See, e.g., Michael S. Denniston & Margaret Smith Kubiszyn, www.yourclient.com:
Choosing Domain Names and Protecting Trademarks on the Internet, 61 ALA. LAW. 1, 40 (Jan.
2000) (discussing how to protect client trademarks on the internet); Jeremy D. Mishkin, Master of
Your Domain-An Overview of the Anticybersquatting Consumer ProtectionAct, 18 CoM M.
LAW. 3 (Spring 2000) (discussing ACPA establishment of a cause of action for bad faith
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If a trademark owner cannot demonstrate that his or her trademark is
well known beyond the niche area and that the trademark was used in
association with particular goods or services, the trademark owner may
not be able to establish the "famous" requirement under the FTDA;
however, the trademark owner can now assert a claim under the
ACPA. 14 1 As long as a trademark is either distinctive or famous, the
trademark is entitled to protection under the ACPA. 142
This
requirement arguably lowers the threshold to assert a claim against
cybersquatters. This avoids the costly burden of proof for both
distinctiveness and fame required under the FTDA as interpreted by the
143
Second Circuit.
As discussed above, distinctiveness is a term of art in trademark
law.144 It "refers to the inherent qualities of a mark and is completely
different from fame."'' 45 A mark can be distinctive even before it has
been used or becomes known or famous. 146 Examples of distinctive
trademarks include BIOMEVA, DALAMA, and SUPPRA; these
trademarks are coined words and thus inherently distinctive. 147 A
trademark that is considered distinctive under the ACPA enjoys a lower
level of distinctiveness scrutiny compared to a trademark under the
FTDA. 148 Indeed, the Second Circuit-the same court that imposes a

registration, use or "trafficking in" domain names); Joel Voelzke, New Cybersquatting Law Gives
Trademark Owners Powerful New Weapons Against Domain Name Pirates, 17:2 CLW 3 (Feb.
2000) (discussing range of new legal tools available to plaintiff's against owners of domain
names corresponding to trade or personal names).
141. Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 497 n.10 (noting that the question of whether the plaintiff's
mark was well-known to the defendant's customers did not need to be reached, as it would have
had to have been addressed under the FTDA, "since the ACPA provides protection not only to
famous marks but also to distinctive marks regardless of fame").
142. Id. at 497 (finding the mark SPORTY'S distinctive and therefore protected under the
ACPA); see also 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii)(I) (West Supp. 2000).
143. See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 227-28 (2d Cir. 1999); supra notes
39-40 and accompanying text (discussing that ownership of a famous trademark is not enough to
assert a claim against cybersquatters under the FTDA).
144. Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 497; see also supra Part II.B (discussing how cybersquatters
caused the FTDA to be ineffective as fame within a niche market is not enough, but rather
heightened distinctiveness is required).
145. Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 497.
146. Id.
147. See MCCARTHY, supra note 74, § 11:5-6 (discussing that fanciful marks receive the
highest form of trademark protection because they consist of coined words that are unknown or
unfamiliar to the ordinary consumer and have been invented for the sole purpose of functioning as
a trademark).
148. Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 497 (acquired distinctiveness through use and presumption of
distinctiveness after five continuous years of exclusive use); Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 215-16
(heightened distinctiveness).
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under the
heightened level of distinctiveness on trademarks
149
FTDA--even allows a presumption of distinctiveness.
Distinctiveness can be presumed if a registered trademark has
become uncontestable through its continuous use for five years.' 50 A
mark is distinctive if it is either inherently distinctive or has acquired
distinctiveness, or a secondary meaning. 15 1 A descriptive mark that has
been in use for more than five consecutive years is entitled to
registration and protection under trademark law. 152 Imposing the
ordinary interpretation of distinctiveness as previously existed in
trademark law, rather than the heightened distinctiveness requirement
espoused by the Second Circuit in Nabisco, is consistent with
congressional intent under the ACPA. As a result, cybersquatting
activities are minimized with a more effective legal tool that addresses
the problems generated by the cyberspace medium.153
C. Identical or Confusingly Similar
Unlike the FTDA, under which the complex "likelihood of dilution"
test or the almost improbable "actual dilution" test is required as proof
of dilutive use of a famous and distinctive mark by a domain name, the
ACPA allows an easier standard to be met. The ACPA requires that the
domain name be either "identical or confusingly similar" to the
distinctive mark. 154

149. Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 497.
150. 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (1994); Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 497 (quoting Equine Techs., Inc. v.
Equitechnology, Inc., 68 F.3d 542, 545 (1st Cir. 1995)). The court in Sporty's Farm noted that
the plaintiff had filed an affidavit under 15 U.S.C. § 1065 that rendered the registration
incontestable, which entitles the registered trademark "to a presumption" of inherently distinctive.
Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 497.
151. 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1994 & West Supp. 1998) (stating that a descriptive mark can be
registered if it has become distinctive of the goods or services in commerce, that is, the mark has
been in substantially exclusive and continuous use for five years); N. Light Tech., Inc. v. N.
Lights Club, 97 F. Supp. 2d 96, 116 (D. Mass. 2000); I.P. Lund Trading v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d
27, 39 (1st Cir. 1998).
152. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(0 (1994 & West Supp. 1998).
153. Broadbridge Media v. Hypercd.com, 106 F. Supp. 2d 505, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). The
court stated:
To the extent Congress enacted the ACPA intending to give trademark owners
inexpensive and effective legal remedies that were uncertain and expensive under then
existing trademark law, plaintiff's initiation of this in rem proceeding is consistent with
that Congressional intent since [defendant's] proposed use of the domain name which
is nearly identical to plaintiff's trademark is certain to engender a presumptively
meritorious yet expensive trademark action against him.
Id.
154. Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501
(1999) (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d) (West 1998)). A commentator has suggested that the
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This new standard, however, raises several questions. If a domain
name and a trademark are not identical, the domain name and the
trademark must be confusingly similar. What does "confusingly
similar" mean? What did Congress intend "confusingly similar" to
mean? Does "confusingly similar" mean a simple comparison of the
domain name to the trademark or does it mean courts must apply the
traditional and more comprehensive trademark infringement test of
"likelihood of confusion?"
The plain language of the statute suggests a simple, direct
comparison between the trademark and the domain name: "a domain
155
name that ... is identical to or confusingly similar to that mark.'
Further, the language of the ACPA is significantly different from the
language found in the trademark infringement statute,1 56 which dictates
that a contextual comparison of trademarks and infringement is only
found if the use is likely to cause confusion. 157 At least one court has
grouped "identical to" with "confusingly similar" and interpreted the
statute to require a simple and direct comparison between the protected
trademark and the domain name. 158 Such interpretation is certainly

ACPA triggers a trademark infringement or likelihood of confusion analysis. Martin, supra note
115, at 596-99. Such analysis, however, is contrary to the plain language of the ACPA and the
congressional intent to lower the burden of proof in combating cybersquatting activities. See
supra notes 115-36 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative history and terms of
ACPA); see also N. Light Tech., 97 F. Supp. 2d at 117 (discussing that since there was no
identical claim, the case turns rather "upon whether Northernlights.com is 'confusingly similar' to
NORTHERN LIGHT (R)").
155. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii) (West Supp. 2000); see also Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at
497 n. II ("We note that 'confusingly similar' is a different standard from the 'likelihood of
confusion' standard for trademark infringement."); MCCARTHY, supra note 74, § 23:4 (1999)
(noting "confusingly similar," when appropriately modified in context, can refer solely to the
similarity of marks themselves).
156. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1114(l) (West 1997 & Supp. 2000).
157. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1114(1) provides in relevant part:
Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation
of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or
advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is
likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive; or
(b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy or colorably imitate a registered mark and apply
such reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation to labels, signs, prints,
packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertisements intended to be used in
commerce upon or in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or
advertising of goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely
to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive,
shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter provided.
Id.
158. N. Light Tech., 97 F. Supp. 2d at 117.
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consistent with Congress's goal to stop cybersquatting activities where
individuals register domain names without any intention to use the
names in commerce, except for selling the names back to the trademark
holders. 159 Moreover, the ACPA does not require that the parties'
goods or services be relevant to a cybersquatting claim; traditional proof
of likelihood of confusion is unnecessary. 160 This indicates that
Congress was not concerned with infringement activities, but rather
with abusive domain name registrations. Thus, to interpret "confusingly
similar" as identical to the "likelihood of confusion" infringement
standard would largely undermine congressional intent to curb
16 1
cybersquatting activities.
Courts that have had the opportunity to apply the ACPA directly
compare the domain name and the protected trademark when
determining whether the domain name is identical or confusingly
similar to the protected trademark. 162 For example, sportys.com has
been found confusingly similar to the SPORTY'S trademark even
163
though the domain name is not precisely identical to the trademark.
In comparing a domain name to a trademark, courts note that on the
Internet, web page addresses do not allow apostrophes and
ampersands. 164 Thus, the second level domain name of sportys.com
(sportys) is indistinguishable from the trademark SPORTY'S.,6 5
Similarly, morrisonfoerster of morrisonfoerster.com is identical to the
trademark MORRISON & FOERSTER. 166 Further, the top level
domain names of sportys.com and morrisonfoerster.commerely signify
the site's commercial nature. 167 As a result, the differences between the
68
domain name and the trademark are inconsequential. 1
D. "Dilutive" of a Famous Mark
Liability under the ACPA is imposed with respect to a famous mark
if the domain name is "identical or confusingly similar to or dilutive of'
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 498 (2d Cir. 2000); N.
Light Tech., 97 F. Supp. 2d at 117.
163. Sporty's Farn, 202 F.3d at 498.
164. See, e.g., id. at 497-98; Morrison & Foerster v. Wick, 94 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1130 (D.
Colo. 2000).
165. Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 498.
166. Morrison & Foerster, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 1130 (applying a direct comparison between the
plaintiff's trademarks and defendant's domain names, not the likelihood of confusion test).
167. See Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 499; Morrison & Foerster,94 F. Supp. 2d at 1130.
168. Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 498.
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the famous mark. 169 A consistent interpretation of the ACPA would
suggest that "dilutive" of the famous mark requires a direct comparison
between the domain name and the famous mark, 170 not a comprehensive
analysis of dilution as required by the circuit courts for a claim under
the FTDA. 171 As of today, no appellate court has had an opportunity to
interpret "dilutive" of a famous mark within the meaning of the
ACPA. 172
One
lower
court
has
suggested
that
dizneerepresentssexkittens.com is dilutive of the registered DISNEY
73
trademark while not being "identical" or "confusingly similar." 1
Likewise, no appellate courts have provided an interpretation of
"famous" within the meaning of ACPA. 174 Though the ACPA
distinguishes distinctive and famous trademarks by imposing different
liability provisions with respect to distinctive trademarks and famous
trademarks, some courts have incorrectly mixed their analysis under the
ACPA with the FTDA. 175 As a result, the trademark owner faces a
higher burden of proof than what is actually required under the ACPA.
For example, the trademark CELLO has been used in commerce to sell
high-end stereo equipment for fifteen years in six states and fourteen
countries. 176 More than forty-two million dollars worth of audio
equipment has been sold under the trademark CELLO. 177 An Internet
user, who did not own any intellectual property right in the trademark
CELLO, registered cello.com and offered to sell the domain name to the

169. 15 U.S.C.A. § I1 25(d)(1)(A)(ii)(H) (West Supp. 2000).
170. Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. Spencer, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d 1026, 1030 (E.D. Cal. 2000) (citing
Panavision Int'l L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1327 (9th Cir. 1998)) (holding defendant's use
of and trafficking in Porsche's trademark in the domain name porschesource.com put Porsche's
name and reputation at his mercy).
171. See supra Part lI.C (discussing how cybersquatters caused the creation of the likelihood
of dilution versus actual dilution).
172. Cello Holdings, L.L.C. and Cello Music & Film Sys., Inc. v. Lawrence-Dahl Co., 89 F.
Supp. 2d 464, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (considering both the FTDA and the ACPA but analyzing
dilution only under the FTDA); see also Porsche Cars, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1030 (quoting
Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1327) (holding defendant's use of and trafficking in Porsche's trademark
in the domain name porschesource.comput Porsche's name and reputation at his mercy).
173. N. Light Tech. Inc. v. N. Lights Club, 97 F. Supp. 2d 96, 117 n.26 (D. Mass. 2000).
174. See Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 496 n.10 (2d Cir.
2000) (avoiding the fame analysis because the SPORTY'S trademark is distinctive and thus
sufficient for a claim under the ACPA, 15 U.S.C. § 125(d)(l)(A)(ii)(I)).
175. Cello, 89 F. Supp. 2d at 472 (finding that "[a] genuine issue of fact exists as to whether
the mark 'Cello' is 'famous' within the meaning of the FTDA and ACPA" and citing the FTDA
statute for the listing of eight non-exclusive considerations for famousness inquiry under the
FTDA); Shields v. Zuccarini, 89 F. Supp. 2d 634, 638-39 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (applying the criteria of
the FTDA to determine whether the plaintiff's mark was famous under the ACPA).
176. Cello, 89 F. Supp. 2d at 467.
177. See id.
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trademark owner of CELLO and nine other Internet companies. 178 At
the time the Internet user registered cello.com, he was aware that
CELLO was the brand name for the audio equipment. 179 The trademark
owner brought claims against the domain name registrant under both the
FTDA and the ACPA. The court analyzed both statutes and denied the
plaintiffs summary judgment motion because a reasonable factfinder
could conclude the trademark CELLO is neither famous nor distinctive
80
and the defendant's cello.com does not dilute the CELLO trademark.1
The court mixed the meanings of "famous" and "distinctiveness" under
the heightened level of
the FTDA with the ACPA and imposed
18 1
distinctiveness on the trademark CELLO.
Such a decision ignores the plain language of and the congressional
intent behind the ACPA.' 82 As illustrated above, the ACPA extends
protection to trademarks that are arbitrary (such as APPLE for
computers or CELLO for audio equipment) and suggestive (such as
APPLE-A-DAY for vitamin tablets), 183 as well as descriptive
trademarks that have acquired secondary meaning.84 Under the ACPA,
is
the trademark CELLO should be entitled to protection and cello.com
185
unquestionably identical to the distinctive CELLO trademark.
E. The Bad Faith Requirement
The most important requirement of a cause of action under the ACPA
is the bad faith intent to profit from the use of another's trademark.
186
Congress intended to use this element to tailor the ACPA narrowly.
The statute covers only cases where the trademark owner can
"demonstrate that the defendant registered, trafficked in, or used the
offending domain name with bad-faith intent to profit from the goodwill
87
of a mark."1

178. See id. at 467, 467-68.
179. See id. at 468.
180. See id. at 472-74.
181. See id. at 471-73.
182. See supra Part II.A (describing the ACPA, its purpose, and its legislative history).
183. MCCARTHY, supra note 74, § 11:71; see also Bigstar Entm't, Inc. v. Next Big Star, Inc.,
105 F. Supp. 2d 185, 195 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (discussing the concept of distinctiveness in trademark
law).
184. See supra notes 144-53 and accompanying text (discussing the definition of the term
"distinctive" as it is used in trademark law).
185. See N. Light Tech., Inc. v. N. Lights Club, 97 F. Supp. 2d 96, 117 (D. Mass. 2000)
(interpreting the concept of distinctiveness in trademark law).
186. H.R. REP. No. 106-464, at 10 (1999).
187. Id.
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A registrant of a domain name can only be liable under the ACPA if
the owner of the trademark can establish that the registrant registered
the domain name with a bad faith intent to profit from the use of the
trademark. 188 If the registrant registered a domain name that is
identical, confusingly similar, or dilutive to a distinctive and/or famous
mark for reasons other than a bad faith intent to profit from the
protected mark's goodwill, the ACPA is not applicable. 189 Even if the
registrant was fully aware of the trademark status of the domain name
when he/she registered the domain name, as long as the registrant
obtained the registration for reasons other than a bad faith intent to
profit, the registrant is not liable under the ACPA. 19° The ACPA
protects "innocent domain name registrations."' 19 1 Indeed, a court may
not find that there was bad faith intent if it "determines that the person
believed and had reasonable grounds to believe that the use of the
domain name was a fair use 192 or [was] otherwise lawful."' 93
The ACPA provides a list of nine non-exclusive factors for finding
bad faith intent to profit. 194 These non-exclusive factors are for courts
188. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i) (West Supp. 2000).
189. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d)(1)(C); Cello Holdings L.L.C. and Cello Music & Films Sys.,
Inc. v. Lawrence Dahi Co., 89 F. Supp. 2d 464, 473-74 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding defendant's use
of trademark in domain name with intent to profit was not indicative of bad faith and thus
plaintiff was denied summary judgment under the ACPA).
190. H.R. REP. No. 106-412, at 10 (1999); see also BroadBridge Media, L.L.C. v.
Hypercd.com, 106 F. Supp. 2d 505, 511-12 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding bad faith where defendant
held domain name hostage until the plaintiff paid the defendant or the plaintiff promised not to
sue and allowed the defendant to use the domain name); Cello, 89 F. Supp. 2d at 473-74 (finding
a genuine issue of material fact as to whether defendant believed use of domain name was fair or
otherwise lawful).
191. H.R. REP. No. 106-412, at 10.
192. Fair use is a defense codified in 15 U.S.C. § 11 15(b)(4) (1998). It is
the use of the name, term, or device charged to be an infringement is a use, otherwise
than as a mark, of the party's individual name in his own business, or of the individual
name of anyone in privity with such party, or of a term or device which is descriptive
of and used fairly and in good faith only to describe the goods or services of such
party, or their geographic origin.
15 U.S.C. § 11 15(b)(4) (1998); see also Car-Freshner Corp. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 70 F.3d
267, 270 (2d Cir. 1995) ("[Flair use permits others to use a protected mark to describe aspects of
their own goods."); Bihari v. Gross, 119 F. Supp. 2d 309, 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (discussing the
fair use defense in a case where defendant used plaintiff's trademark as metatag and holding
defendant's use was fair because the use of the trademark was in its descriptive sense and was
done in good faith).
193. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii) (West Supp. 2000).
194. Under 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125 (d)(1)(B)(i), the nine factors are:
(I) the trademark or other intellectual property rights of the person, if any, in the
domain name;
(II) the extent to which the domain name consists of the legal name of the person or a
name that is otherwise commonly used to identify that person;
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to consider when evaluating whether a bad faith intent to profit from the
goodwill of the protected trademark exists. 195 An examination of the
factors reveals inconsistency or redundancy in factor IX. Factor IX
calls for "distinctive and famous within the meaning of subsection
(c)(1) of this section." Section 43(c)(1) of the Lanham Act is the heart
of the FTDA.196 As analyzed in Section II, "distinctive" and "famous"
within the meaning of the FTDA requires an extremely high burden of
proof. 197 These two elements narrow the type of trademarks that are
entitled to the broad protection of the FTDA. 198 Indeed, only nationally
renowned and very distinctive trademarks receive the federal antidilution protection. 199 This heightened requirement excludes many

(III) the person's prior use, if any, of the domain name in connection with the bona
fide offering of any goods or services;
(IV) the person's bona fide noncommercial or fair use of the mark in a site accessible
under the domain name;
(V) the person's intent to divert consumers from the mark owner's online location to a
site accessible under the domain name that could harm the goodwill represented by the
mark, either for commercial gain or with the intent to tarnish or disparage the mark, by
creating a likelihood of confusion as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or
endorsement of the site;
(VI) the person's offer to transfer, sell, or otherwise assign the domain name to the
mark owner or any third party for financial gain without having used, or having an
intent to use, the domain name in the bona fide offering of any goods or services, or the
person's prior conduct indicating a pattern of such conduct;
(VII) the person's provision of material and misleading false contact information when
applying for the registration of the domain name, the person's intentional failure to
maintain accurate contact information, or the person's prior conduct indicating a
pattern of such conduct;
(VIII) the person's registration or acquisition of multiple domain names which the
person knows are identical or confusingly similar to marks of others that are distinctive
at the time of registration of such domain names, or dilutive of famous marks of others
that are famous at the time of registration of such domain names, without regard to the
goods or services of the parties; and
(IX) the extent to which the mark incorporated in the person's domain name
registration is or is not distinctive and famous within the meaning of subsection (c)(l)
of this section.
Id. § 1125(d)(l)(B)(i).
195. Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 498 (2d Cir. 2000)
("[W]e are not limited to considering just the listed factors when making our determination of
whether the statutory criterion has been met. The factors are, instead, expressly described as
indicia that 'may' be considered along with other facts."); see also BroadBridge Media, 106 F.
Supp. 2d at 512 ("The 'bad faith' statutory list not being exclusive, I may take into account other
factors bearing on bad faith intent to profit.").
196. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(1)(IX).
197. See supra Part II.B (discussing the difficulties encountered by trademark owners in the
first, second, third, and ninth circuits).
198. See id.
199. See I.P. Lund Trading APS, Kroin Inc. v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 47 (1st Cir. 1998).
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trademarks that are not so famous and inherently distinctive, but,
nevertheless, valuable enough to be subjected to cybersquatting
conduct. 200 To combat this problem, the ACPA was supposed to lower
the bar and provide protection for these marks. 20 1 Factor IX contradicts
that intent and the plain language of the other provisions in the
ACPA. 2°2 Most trademarks that are entitled only to protection under the
ACPA would yield negative answers on factor IX because these
trademarks are certainly not "distinctive and famous within the meaning
of subsection (c)(1) of this section." 20 3 If the reference to "within the
meaning of subsection (c)(1) of Section 43" is deleted from factor IX,
the inconsistency problem will be eliminated. Nevertheless, the
redundancy problem remains. Factor IX still lists "distinctive and
famous" as a consideration even though "distinctive and famous" are
the very first elements courts must consider in determining whether a
mark is entitled to protection under the ACPA prior to analyzing an
existence of bad faith intent to profit from the goodwill of the
trademark. 2°4 This factor should not be included in the enumerated
factors for finding a bad faith intent to profit.
Interestingly, the most important factor in finding a bad faith intent to
profit is not listed in the enumerated factors. It is generally "the unique
circumstances" of a particular case. 2°5 For example, "[a] competitor X
of Company Y has registered Y's trademark as a domain name and then
transferred [the domain] name to Subsidiary Z which operates a
business wholly unrelated to Y."206 Competitor X has exhibited indicia
of bad faith: X did not have trademark rights in the domain name at the
time X registered the domain name; the domain name was not X's legal
name; X did not have an active web site with the domain name address
200. Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 497 (applying the ACPA because "the new law was adopted
specifically to provide courts with a preferable alternative to stretching federal dilution law when
dealing with cybersquatting cases").
201. See id. at 497 n. 10 (noting that it does not have to analyze fame under the ACPA because
the trademark in question was distinctive).
202. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii)(I)-(lI) (West Supp. 2000).
203. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d)(l)(B)(i)(IX).
204. Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 499 ("[A]s we discussed above, the sporty's mark is
undoubtedly distinctive, see id. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(IX)." (citation in original)).
205. Id. at 499 (stating that the most important basis for its finding of bad faith is "the unique
circumstances of this case, which do not fit neatly into the specific factors enumerated by
Congress but may nevertheless be considered under the statute"); see also Morrison & Foerster v.
Wick, 94 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1133 (D. Colo. 2000) ("The most persuasive reason for concluding
that [defendant] acted with bad faith intent does not fit neatly into the specific factors enumerated
in the ACPA. I may nevertheless consider it under the statute ....
[Defendant's] own testimony
demonstrate his bad faith.").
206. Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 496.
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until the litigation began; X did not claim that the use of the domain
name was noncommercial or a fair use; and X transferred the domain
name to its subsidiary for the purpose of preventing Y from using the
20 7
domain name.
The unique circumstances of a case, however, allow courts full
discretion to determine bad faith intent to profit as the courts see fit. A
lower court has found bad faith in a case where the defendant targeted
plaintiff's trademarks, created fictitious entities to register protected
trademarks as domain names, and offered dubious explanations for the
selection of these domain names. 20 8 Another lower court found bad
faith in a case where the defendant held the domain name hostage until
the plaintiff either paid him for the transfer or rental of the domain
name, or allowed him to have uncontrolled use of plaintiff's trademark
together with a promise not to be sued for any use of the trademark. 209
Not all courts find bad faith intent to profit. For example, in a case
where the defendant knew about the commercial success of the
plaintiff's trademark as a brand name in a particular industry, had no
ownership of the trademark, and registered the trademark as a domain
name solely for the purpose of selling the domain name to others.
At
2 10
summary judgment, the court did not find bad faith intent to profit.
Finding bad faith intent to profit is entirely subjective. Trademark
owners rest the outcome of their litigation against cybersquatters at the
mercy of the courts. One court may find bad faith intent to profit while
another may not under similar circumstances. As demonstrated above,
judicial interpretation of bad faith intent to profit since the passage of
the ACPA has not been consistent. At the early stage of judicial
interpretation of the ACPA, courts should review congressional intent
when they apply the ACPA.2 1 1 Judicial decisions should strive to yield
207. See id. at 498-99.
208. N. Light Tech. v. N. Lights Club, 97 F. Supp. 2d 96, 119 (D. Mass. 2000), aff'd, 236
F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 2001).
209. BroadBridge Media, L.L.C. v. Hypercd.com, 106 F. Supp. 2d 505, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
210. Cello Holdings, L.L.C. and Cello Music & Film Sys., Inc. v. Lawrence-Dahl Co., 89 F.
Supp. 2d 464,473-74 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
211. H.R. REP. No. 106-412, at 11 (1999) (explaining congressional intent behind 15
U.S.C.A. § I125(d)(1)(B)(IV) (West Supp. 2000), "the person's bona fide noncommercial or fair
use of the mark in a site accessible under the domain name").
[B]alance the interests of trademark owners with the interests of those who would
make the lawful noncommercial or fair uses of others marks online, such as in
comparative advertising, comment, criticism, parody, newsreporting, etc ..... The fact
that a person may use a mark in a site in such a lawful manner may be an appropriate
indication that the person's registration or use of the domain name lacked the required
element of bad faith.
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consistent results that would balance the rights of trademark owners and
212
the interests of innocent registrants of domain names.
F. In rem Jurisdictionand Its Ambiguity
In drafting the ACPA, Congress observed that many cybersquatters
elude trademark enforcement because they are foreign entities and it is
impossible to obtain in personam jurisdiction over them. 213 In addition,
cybersquatters often provided aliases and false information to the
registrar of domain names and thus could not be found.2 14 This created
a problem for trademark owners who wanted to initiate an action and
serve the complaint on cybersquatters. 215 To solve this problem,
Congress included an in rem provision in the ACPA.
Under the ACPA, trademark owners can now assert an in rem action
against the domain name itself. 216 This significant provision of the
ACPA essentially overturns the holding in Porsche Cars North America
212. The Internet has also become a forum for critical commentary. The registration of
domain names in the form of the name of the company and "sucks.com" is common and is a part
of "cybergripping." Lucent Tech., Inc. v. Lucentsucks.com, 95 F. Supp. 2d 528, 535 n.9 (E.D.
Va. 2000) (citing Greg Farrell, From Source Grapes to Online Whine, USA TODAY, Apr. 6,
2000, at 01B); see also Thomas E. Anderson, Emerging Intellectual Property Issues in
Cyberspace, 78 MICH. B.J. 1260, 1263 (1999) ("Cybergrippers are websites dedicated to
criticizing a person, product, or business.").
213. S. REP. No. 106-140, at 10 (1999); BroadBridge Media, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 506-07
(describing an in rem action against domain name hypercd.com since the registrant is a citizen of
British Columbia, Canada).
214. S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 10 ("A significant problem faced by trademark owners in the
fight against cybersquatting is the fact that many cybersquatters register domain names under
aliases or otherwise provide false information in their registration applications in order to avoid
identification and service of process by the mark owner.").
215. See id.
216. The in rem provision provides:
The owner of a mark may file an in rem civil action against a domain name in the
judicial district in which the domain name registrar, domain name registry, or other
domain name authority that registered or assigned the domain name is located if
(i) the domain name violates any right of the owner of a mark registered in the Patent
and Trademark Office, or protected under subsection (a) and (c); and
(ii) the court finds that the owner(I) is not able to obtain in personam jurisdiction over a person who would have
been a defendant and in a civil action under paragraph (1); or
(II) through due diligence was not able to find a person who would have been a
defendant in a civil action under paragraph (1) by(aa) sending a notice of the alleged violation and intent to proceed under
this paragraph to the registrant of the domain name at the postal and e-mail
address provided by the registrant to the registrar; and
(bb) publishing notice of the action as the court may direct promptly after
filing the action.
15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d)(2)(A) (West Supp. 2000).
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the court held that the Lanham Act did not
Inc. v. Porche.com, in which
217
authorize in rem actions.
The ACPA allows the trademark owner to bring an in rem action
against a domain name if the trademark being registered as the domain
name is a registered trademark or protected under section 43(a) or (c) of
the Lanham Act, 218 and the trademark owner cannot obtain personal
jurisdiction over the registrant or is unable to locate the defendant
registrant.2 19 With due diligence, the trademark owner must attempt to
locate the defendant registrant by sending notice of the in rem action to
the registrant at both the postal address and the e-mail address listed in
the registration and by publishing a220notice of the action after filing the
in rem proceeding as a court directs.
In an in rem proceeding against the domain name itself under the
ACPA, however, the trademark owner may not assert claims for
damages or attorneys' fees. 22' The trademark owner is limited to
having the domain name transferred to it or obtaining a cancellation or
forfeiture of the domain name. 222 Further, the in rem action can only be
filed in the judicial district where the domain name registrar or registry
is located.2 23 A domain name also has its "situs" for jurisdictional
purposes where "documents sufficient to establish control and authority
of the registration and use of the domain are
regarding the disposition 224
deposited with the court."
217. Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. Allporche.com, 51 F. Supp. 2d 707, 709, 712 (E.D. Va.
1999) (expressing concern over the constitutional implications of in rem actions that the exercise
of in rem jurisdiction over domain names without in personam jurisdiction over the domain
names' owner might violate the Due Process Clause), vacated and remanded, 215 F.3d 1320 (4th
Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (holding the ACPA allows in rem action against domain names and
applies retroactively to plaintiffs action against defendant against domain names).
218. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d)(2)(A)(i).
219. Lucent Tech., Inc. v. Lucentsucks.com, 95 F. Supp. 2d 528, 530-32 (E.D. Va. 2000)
(dismissing an in rem action in a case where the plaintiff was able to obtain in personam
jurisdiction over the registrant but initiated the in rem action based on the ground that it was not
able to find the registrant); see also 15 U.S.C. § I125(d)(2)(A)(ii).
220. 15 U.S.C.A. § I 125(d)(2)(B)(A)(ii).
221. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d)(2)(D)(i).
222. Id. Procedurally, the trademark owner must deliver a file stamped copy of the complaint
to the registrar. The registrar then freezes the domain name, except to transfer or cancel as
ordered by the court. The registrar must also deposit the domain name with the court. The court
can only grant injunctive relief in the form of a forfeiture or cancellation, or transfer the domain
name.
223. 15 U.S.C.A. § l125(d)(2)(A) (stating that an in rem suit can be brought in a judicial
district where the registrar is located or where "documents sufficient to establish control and
authority regarding the disposition of the registration and use of the domain are deposited with
the court").
224. 15 U.S.C.A. § I 125(d)(2)(c)(ii).
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In rem actions in cyberspace have raised some constitutional
concerns. 225 Are the due process rights of domain name registrants
violated in proceedings that adjudicate their interests in absentia? Is a
226
domain name a "res" for purposes of establishing in rem jurisdiction?
A commentator has addressed these constitutional concerns, but not the
ambiguity of the in rem provision under the ACPA. 227 The in rem
provision requires notice of the alleged violation and intent to file an in
rem action against the registrant of the domain name at the registrant's
postal and e-mail addresses. The provision is silent, however, as to how
much time is adequate for such a notice. How much time is reasonable
for the registrant to respond to the notice? To satisfy the Due Process
requirements, how much time should a plaintiff wait after it has sent a
notice of intent to proceed against a domain name to the registrant at the
postal and e-mail addresses provided by the registrant before it initiates
an in rem proceeding?
Further, the provision provides that a plaintiff may proceed with an in
rem action against a domain name if the court finds that the owner is
unable to obtain in personam jurisdiction over the domain name
registrant, or that the plaintiff, through due diligence, is unable to find
the domain name registrant. 228 The provision seems to expressly
provide two bases for an in rem action, and the plaintiff can select either
of the bases for in rem jurisdiction. Does this mean that the plaintiff can
select the second option even though the plaintiff is able to obtain in
personam jurisdiction over the domain name registrant? Is an in rem
proceeding against the domain name appropriate? Should an action
against the registrant be initiated?
Addressing these concerns, in rem actions should only be allowed as
a last resort where in personam jurisdiction is impossible. 2 29 This will
225. See Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. Allporsche.com, 51 F. Supp. 2d 707, 710-13 (E.D. Va.
1999) (raising numerous constitutional concerns associated with in rem jurisdiction in
cyberspace), vacated and remanded, 215 F.3d 1320 (4th Cir. 2000) (per curiam); see also
Thomas R. Lee, In Rem Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 75 WASH. L. REV. 97, 141-45 (2000)
(addressing constitutional concerns and concluding such concerns are not warranted).
226. Lucent Tech., Inc. v. Lucentsucks.com, 95 F. Supp. 2d 528, 535 (E.D. Va. 2000)
(quoting Caesars World Inc. v. Ceasars-Palace.com, No. 99-550-A (E.D. Va. Mar. 3, 2000) (slip
opinion)) (holding that a domain name is a "res" for purposes of establishing in rem jurisdiction
since "[tlhere is no prohibition on a legislative body making something property. Even if a
domain name is no more than data, Congress can make data property and assign its place of
registration as its situs.").
227. Lee, supra note 225, at 141-44.
228. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii)(I), (II) (West Supp. 2000).
229. See 145 CONG. REC. SI 5026 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1999) (statement of Senator Leahy)
("The [Porsche] court held that in rem actions against allegedly diluting marks are not
constitutionally permitted without regard to whether in personam jurisdiction may be
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limit the use of in rem actions to circumstances where the registrants of
domain names are foreign entities or where after all due diligence
efforts have been conducted and a reasonable time of at least ten days of
waiting to hear a response from the eluding registrant has passed.23 ° If a
domain name holder later appears after the passage of the reasonable
waiting period, the in rem action should not be dismissed as a matter of
right in favor of the domain name holder. 23 1 Otherwise, the dismissal
will undermine the intent to curb cybersquatting conduct of individuals
232
who chose to remain elusive, avoiding liability under trademark law.
Further, the dismissal of the in rem action would cause the trademark
owners to waste all the money, time, and effort that it had expended
prior to and during the in rem proceeding. If the trademark owner
wants to assert an additional action against the registrant personally, the
in rem action should be consolidated with the new civil action because
the ACPA provides remedies
that also include the remedy allowed
233
under the in rem action.

exercised.... This legislation does differentiate between those two different categories of domain
name registrants and limits in rem actions to those circumstances where in personam jurisdiction
cannot be obtained."); see also H.R. REP. No. 106-412, at 14 (1999) (noting in personam
jurisdiction can not be found against foreign entities who register protected trademarks as domain
names); Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane v. Coisinoalitalia.com, 128 F. Supp. 2d 340 (E.D. Va. 2001)
(holding that the plaintiff could not maintain in personam claims against a domain name
registrant concurrently with an in rem action against the domain name).
230. Lucent Tech., 95 F. Supp. 2d at 532-34.
231. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d)(3) (West Supp. 2000) ("The civil action established under
paragraph (1)and the in rem action established under paragraph (2), and any remedy available
under either such action, shall be in addition to any other civil action or remedy otherwise
applicable."); id. § I 125(d)(4) ("The in rem jurisdiction established under paragraph (2) shall be
in addition to any other jurisdiction that otherwise exists, whether in rem or in personam."
(emphasis added)); see also Mishkin, supra note 140, at 6 (concluding that the plaintiff must
establish whether due diligence was exercised in attempting to locate defendant or court does not
have personal jurisdiction over person); Voelzke, supra note 140, at 5.
232. Lucent Tech., 95 F. Supp. 2d at 530.
233. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1116 (West 1998 & Supp. 2000) (granting injunctive relief against
violation under section 1125(a), (c) or (d)); 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (awarding profits, damages, and
costs against violation of a registered mark under 1125(a), (c), or (d) and attorney fees in
exception cases); 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c) ("In a case involving the use of a counterfit mark.., the
plaintiff may elect, any time before final judgment is rendered by the trial court, to recover,
instead of actual damages and profits. . . an award of statutory damages ... in the amount of not
less than $5,000 and not more than $100,000 per counterfit mark, . . . as the court considers
just."); 15 U.S.C.A. § I125(d)(l)(C) (West Supp. 2000) ("In any civil action involving the
registration, trafficking, or use of a domain name under this paragraph, a court may order the
forfeiture or cancellation of the domain name or the transfer of the domain name to the owner of
the mark."). Contra Martin, supra note 125, at 842 (suggesting that remedies under the ACPA
and FTDA should be upgraded to deter cybersquatting activities).
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IV. OVERCOMING THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE FTDA: BLAME IT ON THE
CYBERSQUATTERS OR THE CREATION OF UNFAIR PROTECTION

The task of overcoming the shortcomings of the FTDA is not simple.
The ACPA requires trademarks to be either distinctive or famous, but
not both. This requirement, as demonstrated above, allows an easier
burden of proof because it imposes a finding of distinctiveness within
the ordinary meaning of trademark law. 234 Nevertheless, this
requirement also demands proof of fame for "famous" trademarks.
How much fame a famous mark should possess is unclear. Does
"famous" mean that the protected trademarks are known nationally or
just in their niche market? Should the same degree of fame under the
FTDA be required for trademarks brought under the ACPA? Since the
ACPA is aimed specifically at cybersquatting activities, a trademark
should be deemed sufficiently famous within the meaning of the ACPA
if it is known within its niche market, 23 5 regardless of whether the
defendant and the plaintiff participate in a similar or related niche
market. Because the protection under the ACPA is limited as compared
to the broad anti-dilution protection provided under the FTDA, a
requirement under the ACPA of a nationally well-known trademark or a
requirement that the trademark is known beyond its niche market is
unwarranted and inconsistent with the congressional intent under both
the FTDA and the ACPA.2 36
Since Congress did not provide any guidance on "dilutive of a
famous mark," the question arises as to what is "dilutive" within the
meaning of the ACPA. What constitutes "dilutive" on the Internet?

234. See supra notes 144-53 and accompanying text (discussing the concept of distinctiveness
in trademark law).
235. A number of courts have found some trademarks famous under the FTDA if the plaintiff
and the defendant share similar or related niche markets. See, e.g., Times Mirror Magazines, Inc.
v. Las Vegas Sports News, 212 F.3d 157, 166 (3d Cir. 2000) (finding THE SPORTING NEWS
trademark to be famous in the sports periodicals market since both the plaintiff and defendant
operated in a common market), cert. denied sub nom., 121 S.Ct. 760 (2001); Syndicate Sales,
Inc. v. Hampshire Paper Corp., 192 F.3d 633, 640-41 (7th Cir. 1999) (addressing the niche
market debate and holding that the district court erred in concluding the trade dress for a plastic
basket used for floral bouquets was not famous based solely on the niche-market status of the
baskets); see also Washington Speakers Bureau, Inc. v. Leading Auths., Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 488,
503-04 (E.D. Va. 1999) (holding fame can be adequate only if the "diluting uses are directed
narrowly at the same market segment"); Teletech Customer Care Mgmt., Inc. v. TeleTech Co.,
977 F. Supp. 1407, 1409, 1413 (C.D. Cal 1997) (holding fame in a narrow market segment was
present in a case where the plaintiff "may be the largest provider of primarily inbound integrated
telephone and Internet customer care worldwide" and satisfied the threshold requirement under
the FTDA).
236. See supra notes 140-53 and accompanying text (discussing the lower threshold of the
ACPA in comparison to the FTDA by requiring that the trademark be famous or distinctive).
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Cybersquatters do not use the domain name in association with a sale of
goods or services on the Internet, thus there is no "use" of the protected
trademark in commerce that may cause a likelihood of dilution or actual
dilution to the distinctive quality of the protected trademark.2 37 Thus, to
apply the meaning of "dilution" under the FTDA to the ACPA is
erroneous. 238 Dilution under the ACPA is Internet-specific and occurs
if potential customers cannot find a web page at "trademark.com"
because prospective customers of plaintiff may fail to continue to search
for the plaintiff's website, due to frustration or a belief that the plaintiff
does not operate on the Internet. 239 Also, dilution under the ACPA
should include the use of the trademark as a domain name or as part of a
domain name that blurs or tarnishes the image of the trademark
(diszneerepresentssexkitten.comversus DISNEY), regardless of whether
the registrant of the domain name actually provides any goods or
240
products.
The passage of the ACPA is aimed at cybersquatters who Congress
believe have outsmarted trademark law and avoided liability under the
FTDA. Focusing on just cybersquatting, the ACPA, however, creates a
peculiar problem. It creates two classes of protection among trademark
owners, depending on the defendant's activity or lack of activity on the
Internet. For example, an owner of a trademark who learns that a third
party is using a name (not as a domain name) that is dilutive of the
trademark probably wishes that the user of the name registered it as a
domain name. The user of the name was aware of the success of the
trademark and demands that the trademark owner pay him a substantial
sum in exchange for his non-use of the dilutive trademark. The owner
of the trademark in this scenario has no claim under the ACPA because
there is no domain name involved. The owner cannot assert a claim
under the FTDA because the trademark is not famous enough. The
owner also cannot assert a claim under the traditional infringement
theory because the use of the name is dilutive, yet not enough to
generate a "likelihood of confusion." The trademark owner can only
watch with frustration while another trademark owner, who faces a

237. See Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpter, 189 F.3d 868, 880-81 (9th Cir. 1999) (discussing
cybersquatting dilution).
238. See N. Light Tech., Inc. v. N. Lights Club, 97 F. Supp. 2d 96, 117 n.26 (D. Mass. 2000),
aff'd, 236 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 2001).
239. See Avery Dennison, 189 F.3d at 880.
240. See N. Light Tech., 97 F. Supp. 2d at 117 n.26 (noting "the domain name
dizneepresentssexkittens.com is likely inherently dilutive of DISNEY while not being 'identical'
or 'confusingly similar"'). The domain name, disneysucks.com, however is not dilutive. See
Lucent Tech., 95 F. Supp. 2d at 535-36.
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similar situation, except that the second defendant user registers the
dilutive trademark as a domain name, enjoys the full protection and
remedy of the ACPA.
While there is some value in passing a law that is specific to a
perceived problem, it should not create protection for some trademark
owners and not others. The trademark owner in the first scenario should
receive similar protection against dilutive use of his trademark
regardless of whether the dilutive use occurs in cyberspace as a domain
name. This calls for Congress to re-examine existing dilution law and
amend the law so adequate protection is provided to all trademark
owners. An amendment to the FTDA to extend anti-dilution protection
to trademarks that are known within a niche market will at least be a
step in the right direction to minimize unfair protection among
trademark owners against dilutive use.
Moreover, although the ACPA's sole intention is to curb
cybersquatting activities, it fails to address cybersquatting domain name
dispute cases where the plaintiff's trademark has not acquired trademark
status. For example, a young Internet company has adopted the
trademark BIGSTAR and used the domain name bigstar.com for its
website. The company sells CDs and provides chat rooms on topics
such as movies, sports, and celebrities. The company has spent several
million dollars in the last two years to market its BigStar mark and gains
a sizable number of visitors to its website. Along comes a cybersquatter
who knows about BigStar and registers a dozen variations of BigStar as
unflattering and tarnishing domain names. The cybersquatter refuses to
shut down his websites unless the company wires money to his bank
account. The company looks to the ACPA for help. The ACPA is
useless to the company because BigStar is probably deemed descriptive
as a trademark 24 1 and is not entitled to protection because the mark has
been in use for only two years and has, thus, not acquired
distinctiveness. 242 Though the cybersquatting activity is the type
241. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text (contrasting generic and descriptive
marks). The trademark BIGSTAR has been held descriptive when it is used in association with
on-line sales of videocassettes, digital video discs and related movie merchandise, news in the
movie industry, interviews with celebrities, movie previews, and with chat rooms with film
celebrities. Bigstar Entm't, Inc. v. Next Big Star, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 2d 185, 198-202 (S.D.N.Y.

2000).
242. Trademark law requires a minimum of five years of continuous use in order for a mark to
receive the status of presumed distinctiveness and be entitled to registration. See Sporty's Farm
L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 496 (2d Cir. 2000); see also 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 1052(f) (West 1997 & Supp. 2000) (stating that the Trademark Office "may accept as prima
facie evidence that the mark has become distinctive, as used on or in connection with the
applicant's goods in commerce, proof of substantially exclusive and continuous use thereof as a
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contemplated under the ACPA, the company cannot stop such activity.
Given the fact that e-commerce is still in its infantile stage, many
companies that own descriptive trademarks cannot go after
cybersquatters under the ACPA. The root of this problem lies in the
framework of the ACPA; it was structured within the concept of
trademark law and, thus, is bound by trademark law limitations. To
truly combat the cybersquatting problem, Congress must think beyond
the existing trademark law.
V. CONCLUSION

Congress passed the FTDA partially because it wanted to protect
famous trademarks and address cybersquatting problems on the Internet.
The ambiguous language in the FTDA caused the circus among the
circuit courts and did not advance congressional intent very far.
Congress blamed the shortcomings of the FTDA and the polarized
judicial interpretations of the FTDA on the cybersquatters, and then it
passed the ACPA to solve dilution on the Internet. Congress ignored its
own problems with the dilution it had drafted under the FTDA. The
FTDA leaves many trademark owners without protection against
dilutive use because their trademarks are not deemed famous or highly
distinctive enough to be worthy of the anti-dilution protection. Further,
the circus among the circuits creates polarized interpretations and
applications of the FTDA, rendering the federal dilution law ineffective.
This calls for Congress to amend the FTDA to provide clarity and
broaden the anti-dilution protection to many worthy trademarks. The
ACPA is a step in the right direction for curbing a form of dilution but
does not solve all of the problems associated with the FTDA. Though
the passage of the ACPA does cure some cybersquatting dilution
activities, it also creates unfair protection among trademark owners
depending on where the wrong is committed and is not dependent on
the wrong itself. It is important to promote the growth of e-commerce,
but it should be done without causing unfair protection among
trademark owners.

mark by the applicant in commerce for the five years before the date on which the claim of
distinctiveness is made.").

